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Abstract—The diversity in network devices, protocols, data
sources and probes impose different challenges to uniformly
measure and analyse network traffic. Analysing a network means
considering distinctive reporting approaches and diverse methods
to represent data, measure times or identify nodes. In this
work, we tackle these challenges by relying on semantics, taking
advantage of the ontologies’ ability to map high-level network
concepts to concrete information sources of different nature. In
particular, we propose a simple architecture to map network
concepts to data stored in relational databases. Based on this
architecture, we implement a tool that looks for malicious bot
activity, studying, from a unique point of view, DNS traffic from
PCAP sources, and TCP connections from IPFIX reports. This
approach is able to enhance current DNS based botnet detection
methods, taking into account additional heterogeneous analysis
elements.
I. INTRODUCTION
Networks’ capability to interconnect different devices, pro-
tocols, management systems and information sources necessar-
ily yields to heterogeneous environments. This asset challenges
network managers, for whom it is difficult to holistically
manage their systems, having to make use of large, isolated
and diverse measurement solutions. As we describe in the fol-
lowing section, different authors have identified several issues
related to heterogeneity, and, according to their works, we
hypothesise here that semantics (the study of the relationship of
meanings of a sign) is able to solve those issues, correlating
the different information sources through a high conceptual
level.
One of most the relevant issues in network traffic analysis,
is to identify botnets. More than any other source of network
anomalies, botnets represent the most significant medium to
carry out malicious activities today, such as denying services,
spamming, phishing and extorting business data [4], [6]. This
network management need has motivated us to develop a
holistic approach, and to evaluate its capacity to identify
botnets.
The central element of our approach are ontologies, that
is to say formal knowledge representations. Ontologies can
provide a semantic layer between concrete data and network
concepts. In other words, they make it possible for the network
manager to work with instances of concepts (such as latency
measures, a web server address, and timestamps), instead of
raw data.
Under these statements, we make use of ontologies to
evaluate the presence of bots in the local network. In this case,
we study two different data sources, i.e., DNS traffic from
PCAP captures, and the TCP level information from IPFIX
reports. As we explain in the following section, DNS provides
a sound foundation to state-of-the-art bot detection approaches
Indeed, it makes it possible to find traces of botnet collective
behaviour, such as the look up for the IP addresses of the
rendezvous point or the victims. At the same time, we can
identify SYN flooding attacks in the TCP information provided
by IPFIX.
The main contribution of our work is, thanks to ontologies,
it permits to relate different datasets to each other, even if they
have been collected in distinct raw formats by different probes.
Ontologies provide a common language to give meaning to the
different data and then put them into the same network analysis
context. In this case study, we take advantage of this semantic
asset to identify botnet activity.
In the rest of this paper we first present related works.
Then, we present how we have built the ontology considering
state-of-the-art methods to detect botnets. We also describe
the architecture that provides a unique access point to query
different network management elements. Finally, we show the
results of the scenario that we have implemented, analysing a
dataset from a university computer room, reporting possible
bots which some of them are certainly carrying out SYN
flooding.
II. RELATED WORKS
The related research of this work is twofold. From a general
perspective, it addresses challenges resulting from network
heterogeneity. From a specific point of view, we evaluate the
ability of semantic tools to detect botnet activity. In this section
we study significant work regarding both issues.
A. Related work on network heterogeneity
Different researchers have characterised issues associated
to network heterogeneity. For example, Wong et al. [18]
describe interoperability problems in router management. Also,
Lo´pez et al. [10] identify, at least, three different types of
issues concerning measurement: how to name devices and
components, how to represent data and how to measure units.
While in this work we focus on semantic solutions, there
are other techniques that address this problem. For example,
Zurawski et al. [20] and Hanemann et al. [8] have proposed
solutions based on structured languages, specifically on XML
Schema, able to translate data information from different
sources. However, these approaches are limited to the static
representation they provide.
Semantic based solutions to solve interoperability or het-
erogeneity issues have been considered by several authors,
such as Ferreiro et al. [7], Lo´pez et al. [10], Wong et al. [18]
and XuHui et al. [19].
Wong et al. [18] state that ontologies bring some benefits to
network measurement, such as interoperability of information
models and high-level design expressiveness. The authors
formulate an ontology set addressing the interoperability chal-
lenges to configure network routers, focusing on Cisco and
Nortel.
The most prevailing work concerning measurement ap-
proaches is the Measurement Ontology for IP traffic (MOI),
that aims to semantically interface management systems and
measurement devices [13]. MOI is based on the works by
Ferreiro et al. [7], Lo´pez et al. [10] and the MOMENT [17]
project, and it is currently under standardisation at ETSI
Industrial Standardization Group (ISG).
MOI design is inspired by the network measurement needs
of five use cases: network characterization, QoS measurement,
traffic monitoring for security applications, autonomic network
monitoring and management, and law enforcement [12].
MOI considers network measurements as its central on-
tology concept, embracing data related to measures such as
ping, traceroute or the identity of network objects. MOI aims
to structure the network concepts in different modules: IP
traffic measurement ontologies, IP network monitoring sys-
tems, parameters of applications’ quality, QoS-QoE correlation
mechanisms, quality control systems, and transversal security
and privacy. However, for the moment, the most recent docu-
ment describing the implementation of MOI focuses on lower
layers of the ontology. The current MOI architecture consists
of five ontologies: General Concepts, Units, Metadata, Data
and Anonymity.
In the MOMENT project, a relevant MOI’s base, Lo´pez
et al. [10], [17] formulate an approach focused on the above
ontologies to measure heterogeneous network data sources.
The MOMENT project proposes a comprehensive architecture
able to integrate a wide range of probes, measurement infras-
tructures and analysis services.
We can conclude that MOI represents the most important
work on network measurement ontologies, and we aim to
integrate their existing concepts in the scope of this work.
Additionally, an essential component of the MOMENT
proposal is the Relational Database (RDB) to Resource De-
scription Framework (RDF) semantic mediation, for which we
can find different tools [16] such as D2RQ, Virtuoso RDF View
and R2O, none of them prevailing over the other. However, in
this work we can consider D2RQ since it is open source, stable
and used in MOMENT [10].
B. Related work on detecting botnet activity
The use case considered in this paper concerns the detec-
tion of botnets. The term botnet packs two words together that
explain its nature: robot and network. It is indeed a network
that, in its illegal version, is composed of hosts compromised
by a malicious software under the control of a bot master [4].
In this paper we focus on botnet detection methods that rely
on the analysis of Domain Name System (DNS) traffic.
To detect botnets is a difficult task, mainly because botnets
highly differ from each other and evolve over time. Despite
their particularities, bots carry out three common tasks: infect
new devices, look for instructions in a rendezvous point, and
execute their main function, such as carrying out a Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) or sending spam. Among these three
tasks, we can state, from the work by Feily et al. [6], that
the search for the rendezvous point is the most accurate and
general analysis object to detect malicious activity.
Feily et al. also categorize different detection methods
according to four main focus: botnet signatures, network
anomalies, DNS traffic, and data mining [6]. They conclude
that the two most relevant and promising types of methods rely
on the analysis of DNS traffic or data mining. In this work,
we focus on DNS based detection methods, since as we can
conclude from [6], they may be lightweight, and depending on
the approach, able to detect a large number of botnets, even if
they perform encrypted communications.
DNS is an essential Internet protocol. It is used by any
service requiring to translate, for example, human-readable and
easy-to-remember domain names into machine-manipulable
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. The electronic mail service
also depends on DNS service to look for the mail exchangers
(MX) for a certain domain. In a similar way, sophisticated
botnets require DNS to determine the IP addresses of the
rendezvous point and of their victims, or in the case of
spamming bots, to search for mail servers to send spam
through.
Botnets and DNS: According to Bianchi et al. [2] and
Choi et al. [4], botnets’ behaviour is observable in DNS traffic
in different aspects. For example, a high ratio of requests for
non-existing domains (NXDomain) over existing domains (No-
Error) likely means the search of a hidden rendezvous point’s
IP address; an excessive number of simultaneous lookups
for a single domain from different sources possibly denotes
bots searching the victim’s address, preparing a coordinated
attack; domain name-to-IP address records changing too fast
and zones with too short Time to Live (TTL) could indi-
cate methods to protect the rendezvous point. These metrics
are considered by the botnet detection methods from the
DEMONS project and by Choi et al. [4] that we describe here.
DEMONS botnets detection methods: The European
project DEMONS considers two different botnet detectors:
a general botnet detector and StreaMon [2], that focuses on
Conficker.
Conficker has been one of the most spreading botnets in
the last years. It takes advantage of Microsoft’s File sharing
service of vulnerable hosts (445/TCP port) to spread over
the network [9]. As for any botnet, infected hosts need to
contact a Command and Control (C&C) server to look for
instructions. Conficker hides the rendezvous point with their
C&C in an obfuscated domain name, that the bots try to find
performing an extremely high number of DNS queries, and
then, increasing the probability to get NXDomain (non-existing
domain) answers. Streamon thus searches for bots analysing
per host the number of DNS queries, the number of NXDomain
answers and the number of TCP SYNs and SYN/ACKs to and
from port 445. It is worth to note that Streamon measures these
data from PCAP sources, while we aim to integrate additional
heterogeneous probes, e.g. IPFIX reports.
On the other hand, the DEMONS general botnet detector
relies on two different analysis regarding the two possible an-
swers to DNS queries, NXDomain or NoError. The NXDomain
based analysis focuses on detecting “domain lux” botnets,
which frequently change the domain name of their rendezvous
point, to escape from classical blacklisting. Examples of these
botnets are Conficker, Kraken/Bobax, Srizbi and Torpig. In
contrast, the NoError based approach focuses on detecting
malicious domain names, focusing on the unusually fast-
changing domain name-to-IP address mappings. This approach
inspects DNS messages to classify domain names, according
to different metrics, such as: the number of queries for the
domain, the Time-To-Live of A-Records, and the list of IP
addresses to which the domain was mapping.
BotGAD (Botnet Group Activity Dectector): Choi et
al.[4] have developed “BotGAD”, a lightweight and robust
method relying on Domain Name Service (DNS) traffic. Choi
et al. [4] characterise the botnets’ “group activity” or collective
behavior, such as coordinated and simultaneous attacks, that
BotGAD detects through non-supervised machine learning.
Contrary to the DEMONS’ method, BotGAD only analyses
DNS traffic.
BotGAD builds matrices that relate domain names to
timestamps and client IPs of DNS queries for such domains,
and then compare similarities among domain matrices to detect
new botnet activity. Choi et al. state that BotGAD is able to
detect botnets that follow recent evasion methods, in large-
scale networks, in real-time, and even if they encrypt their
messages.
From these works, we can conclude that botnet detection
methods find in DNS a comprehensive analysis base. Also we
conclude that, in the scope of this work, at a first stage, we
can focus on the NXDomain/NoError answer ratio to evaluate
if each host is acting as a bot, searching for its rendezvous
point.
III. A SEMANTIC APPROACH TO ANALYSE BOTNET
ACTIVITY THROUGH HETEROGENEOUS DATA
As stated above, in a general perspective, our work ad-
dresses issues related to heterogeneity, and it aims to develop
an holistic management network support able to uniformly
analyse network traffic from heterogeneous data sources. In
order to evaluate this approach we focus on one important issue
faced by network managers: to detect malicious botnet activity
in the local network. As Figure 1 illustrates, this botnet analysis
focuses on two heterogeneous data sources, DNS traffic and
IPFIX flow reports, that we access through ontologies, creating
a single point of view. In this section we first describe the
rationale behind our approach and the method that allows to
build the ontologies. Then, we illustrate the architecture we
have implemented and the results that make it possible to
conclude that jointly analysing DNS data and IPFIX flows,












Fig. 1. Botnet detection scenario. The analyser accesses DNS data from
PCAP captures and TCP information from IPFIX as RDF graphs, thanks to a
semantic interface.
A. Rationale
To analyse more holistically the possible activity of botnets,
we rely on current DNS botnet detection methods, and we
enhance their outcome by evaluating diverging sources of
information. Our approach looks for two bot-related actions,
which are usually analysed separately in current solutions.
First, as we have explained in Section II, sophisticated bots
search their rendezvous point in domain names according
to previously specified obfuscated patterns. State-of-the-art
detection methods are able to find traces of this rendezvous
search in the DNS lookup traffic. Second, a common goal of
bots is to carry out DDoS attacks, through methods such as
TCP SYN flooding. We can find evidence of this kind of attack
in the TCP information from IPFIX reports.
As we have stated in Section II, the analysis of the NXDo-
main/NoError ratio, from the DNS lookup answers, represents
an accurate and simple metrics to evaluate if a host is acting as
a bot. We can thus rely on a simplified version of the method
proposed in the framework of the DEMONS project and by
Bianchi et al. [2], that we illustrate in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Base algorithm to evaluate bot activity from each
host
NoErrorPerHost ← Select the number of NoError an-
swers per host
NXDomainPerHost← Select the number of NXDomain
answers per host
for i in NoErrorPerHost do
Ratio[i]← NXDomainPerHost[i]/NoErrorPerHost[i]




On the other hand, to execute a SYN flood attack, a bot
floods its victims interrupting the three-way handshake. Hence,
we need to look for TCP connection requests (SYN flag only)
with no subsequent packets in the same flow direction (ACK
flag only). As we describe below in this section, IPFIX private
Information Elements (IEs) [3] include TCP information in
their reports, that we can study as shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Base algorithm to find hosts involved in TCP-
SYN flooding
TcpConnectionF lags← Select the number of interrupted
TCP connections per source host
for i in GETPOSSIBLEBOTS do




By means of ontologies, RDF and SPARQL standards, it is
possible to link the interpreted data from different distributed
sources. Thus it allows us to relate to the same network node
and measurement data to the different information sources.
Since the base analysis are stored in relational databases, we
need to rely on tools, such as D2RQ, that map their data to
semantic descriptions, represented in RDF graphs. Later in this
section we give an overview of the SPARQL queries that we
rely on in this use case.
B. Building the ontology to detect botnets
To design and build ontologies that conceptualise the
network measurement data, we have followed these steps,
relying on the works by [14], [1]: define the purpose, scope
and requirements; model the concepts, their properties and re-
lations; represent the conceptual model in a formalism readable
by machines; and evaluate the ontology.
Purpose, scope and requirements: We need an ontology
that conceptualises aspects related to DNS, IPFIX flow reports
and TCP connections. Also, given that our approach will look
for information in databases, the ontology must map the fields
from the databases to the ontological representation (RDF
graphs) of these concepts. It is important to note that to
consider other network-related concepts we rely on the MOI
ontologies, taking advantage of the extensibility of ontologies.
Concepts, properties and relations: First, in the general
scope of DNS, each message may be composed of five
sections [11]: Header, Question, Answer, Authority (Name
servers) and Additional (information). In this work, we need to
consider the components of messages related to lookups, since
we have chosen to focus on DNS botnet detection methods that
rely on them. The analysis requires Response information, such
as the result (NoError or NXDomain Error), the time of the
query, and the addresses of client and server. This information
is found in the Header section, which embraces the following
fields: Query ID, Question/Response flag, Response code,
Time, Timestamp, Source address and Destination address. We
need to store the information for each DNS message header
and create an equivalent concept in the ontology.
Figure 2 shows a summarised version of the DNS ontology
we have designed, including the linked MOI concepts. DNS-
Data is a child of MeasurementData, a MOI’s high-level con-
cept that models any information carried by any measurement.
All the DNS data composing the message header, described
above, are subclasses of DNSData.
Second, to evaluate whether TCP SYN-flooding attacks are
happening in the network or not, we need to handle concepts
concerning IPFIX reports and the TCP-related information
Fig. 2. Main concepts composing the DNS ontology
they provide. In these reports, we search for incomplete TCP
connections, that is to say, TCP flows from the originating
host with only initial SYN flagged packet and missing ACK
messages. IPFIX makes it possible thanks to two variables
available in the private Information Elements (IEs) that sup-
ports TCP: initialTCPFlags, “the TCP flags on the first TCP
packet in the flow” and unionTCPFlags “the union of the TCP
flags on all packets after the first TCP packet in the flow [3].”
IPFIX reports also include a general set of data that covers:
Source and Destination addresses (IPv4 and IPv6), Source and
Destination ports, Start and End times, and Total packet count.
Figure 3 abstracts relevant concepts from the IPFIX on-
tology we have designed, that we require to detect botnets in
the presented approach. Similarly to the DNS ontology, the
information from IPFIX reports are modeled under the MOI
measurement data class.
It is important to note that we aim to semantically map the
data from the sources involved in the analysis. In this case,
it is possible to link how the datasets identify the network
nodes through the SourceIP and DestinationIP concepts from
the MOI ontologies [13], (See Figure 2 and 3). As well,
the Timestamp concept relates the time information in DNS
messages and flow reports.
Table I lists the DNS and IPFIX required concepts and the
existing MOI equivalents that we link in this analysis.
Fig. 3. Part of the IPFIX ontology and TCP flags-related concepts
Represent the formalism in a machine-readable lan-
guage: We aim to access the network data semantically
represented in the RDF model. This model is based on subject-
predicate-object triple patterns, also called triples. Since in
this use case the data are stored in relational databases,
we rely on the D2RQ mapping tool, and we need then to
TABLE I. REQUIRED CONCEPTS AND MOI EXISTING EQUIVALENTS
DNS Concept TCP/IPFIX MOI current equivalent
Source address Source address SourceIP











describe the ontology in the Turtle based D2RQ mapping
language. Similarly to SPARQL, Turtle formats the data in
subject-predicate-object RDF triples. In this scenario, we need
two different D2RQ ontologies to map the DNS and IPFIX
databases.
C. Architecture
Three main layers compose our approach: a probe-and-
storage, a semantic interface and the analyser. This architecture
relies on a proposal by Lo´pez de Vergara et al. [10], which
focuses on semantic interfaces to relational databases.
Different components in the probe-and-storage layer gather
data from the network and store relevant information in rela-
tional databases. In this botnet detection use case, this layer
is made of a PCAP probe (to filter and collect DNS traffic)
and an IPFIX collector (to store TCP traffic reports). We have
implemented the PCAP/DNS probe adapting the Blockmon
monitoring tool [5]. As IPFIX probe, we have used the YAF
tool suite, particularly the YAF MySQL Mediator, that collects
IPFIX reports and insert them into a relational database.
The semantic interface layer serves a SPARQLendpoint for
each relational database, making it possible to access it as
RDF graphs. This layer depends on the ontologies that map
the concepts to database table and columns. In this case, we
need two mapping ontologies characterizing DNS and IPFIX
concepts.
The analyser layer queries the semantic interfaces using
SPARQL to retrieve the required information. It is in this layer
that we can measure the network and analyse botnet activity.
In this approach, to measure the NXDomain/NoError ratio we
rely on two SPARQL queries. For example, the following
query asks the semantic interface to count the number of non-
existing domain answers per host. The query restricts the data
to DNS message headers (subject) whose QR flag (predicate)
means they are answers (object); and whose Response code
(p) equals 11 in binary, signifying NXDomain error (o). See
Lines 6 and 7:
1 SELECT (COUNT(DISTINCT ?dnsmessage) as ?no)
2 ?dest_addr
3 WHERE {
4 ?dnsmessage a holmondns:DNSMessageHeader ;
5 MD:DestinationIP ?dest_addr ;
6 holmondns:DNSMessageHeader_QR_flag "1" ;
7 holmondns:DNSMessageHeader_R_code "11" .
8 }
9 GROUP BY ?dest_addr
Similarly, we also query the semantic interface to detect
SYN flooding attacks. The following query corresponds to the
first sentence in Algorithm 2. This SPARQL query is restricted
to triples of flows (subject) whose first TCP packet are flagged
(predicate) SYN only (object), and the union of the TCP flags
on all subsequent packets in the flow (predicate) is empty
(object). See Lines 6 and 7 in the query.
1 SELECT (COUNT(DISTINCT ?id) as ?no) ?srcip
2 WHERE {
3 ?flowmsg holmonflows:flows_id ?id ;
4 MD:SourceIP ?srcip ;
5 ?tcpmsg holmonflows:tcp_id ?id ;
6 holmonflows:tcp_initialTCPFlags "S" ;
7 holmonflows:tcp_unionTCPFlags "" .
8 }
9 GROUP BY ?srcip
Note in these queries that we are integrating the MOI as
external ontologies. In these examples, the DestinationIP and
SourceIP concepts, identified by the MD: prefix.
The tools and ontologies that we have used and developed
to implement this architecture are available online at http://
perso.telecom-bretagne.eu/santiagoruano-rincon/holmon/ , in-
cluding instructions on how to reproduce a similar case use.
D. Validating the approach
To validate our approach we have processed a set of cap-
tures from a 19-host students computer room of the Universita`
di Roma Tor Vergata, where it was known that several hosts
were infected by malware. The capture set comprises 1 hour
and 14 minutes of traffic, that we have probed with the PCAP
and IPFIX tools described above.
Table II summarises the offline analysis of such data.
Considering a NXDomain/NoError ratio threshold > 0.10 as
abnormal behaviour, the analysis hypothesises that the top ten
hosts are possible bots. However, the hypothesis is stronger
for the top four: not only their NXDomain/NoError ratio is
higher than 0.79, but also the number of their TCP connection
requests with no subsequent packets are, at least, twice the
average (4982.46). This leads to conclude on SYN floods
sourcing from their IP addresses.
Regarding performance requirements, a four-processors
2.67GHz CPU running Linux analysed the DNS-related data
in 4.235 seconds, in average. However, D2RQ’s optimizing
option (–fast) has allowed to reduce the required time to
0.274 seconds, though increasing instability risks, according
to D2RQ documentation.
We can also compare our approach to the methods de-
scribed in the Related Works section. Streamon is able to
analyse two different types of data: DNS and 445/TCP port
related traffic. However, Streamon inspects only raw traffic
from PCAP captures. On the other hand, BotGAD [4] performs
a highly accurate report and it is able to evolve over time,
learning new collective bot behaviour. However, it relies only
on DNS traffic.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Ontologies make it possible to analyse the status of a net-
work through a unified data model. In this work, we have relied
TABLE II. SUMMARISED RAPPORT OF BOTNET ANALYSIS
# Host NXDomain/NoError Aborted TCP
conn.
Bot probability
1 host.139 0.93 18240 SYN Flooding
2 host.142 0.92 14725 SYN Flooding
3 host.147 0.87 27206 SYN Flooding
4 host.146 0.79 13865 SYN Flooding
5 host.71 0.25 0 Suspicious
6 host.63 0.25 0 Suspicious
7 host.62 0.25 0 Suspicious
8 host.97 0.23 123 Suspicious
9 host.88 0.13 110 Suspicious
10 host.144 0.12 0 Suspicious
11 host.87 0.09 131 Unknown
12 host.92 0.06 100 Unknown
13 host.75 0.06 0 Unknown
14 host.94 0.04 107 Unknown
15 host.96 0.03 130 Unknown
16 host.53 0 0 Unknown
17 host.65 0 0 Unknown
18 host.82 0 133 Unknown
19 host.83 0 113 Unknown
Threshold: 0.10 Avg: 4982.46
on ontologies and semantic tools to evaluate the botnet activ-
ity in a network by uniformly analysing two heterogeneous
data sources. We have designed a three-layered architecture:
probe-and-storage, semantic interface and analyser layers, and
implemented it through a tool that helps to evaluate whether
local hosts act as malicious bots or not. Specifically, the tool
also helps to assess if malicious bots are SYN flooding their
victims.
To carry out this analysis, we have considered two data
sources: DNS messages captured by a PCAP probe, and
TCP information included in IPFIX reports. Our implemented
tool analyses both data sources as RDF data, querying two
SPARQLendpoints, which are themselves served by semantic
interfaces against data stored in relational databases. We have
validated this case study with an actual data set, which allows
us to conclude that semantics provide an interesting foundation
to holistically analyse networks, thanks to its capacity to
handle information at a conceptual level.
Moreover, semantic tools present additional advantages that
can further improve a holistic analysis. For example, they make
it possible to share knowledge with different or external agents.
In this scope, current SPARQL specification [15] allows for
running queries that directly link data from different sources
such as the DNS and IPFIX endpoints. However, the D2RQ
available today lacks support for federated queries.
Semantics also makes it possible to infer knowledge regard-
ing the status of the network. In future work, we could take
advantage of semantic reasoners to analyse the probability that
a host is acting as a bot, or to detect abnormal behaviour.
In future work we would like to explore these features, and
to expand our architecture by considering other data sources,
in order to have an even more holistic view of the network,
simplifying and unifying network analysis.
It would be also interesting to test this approach in large-
scale scenario, with a larger dataset, to evaluate its perfor-
mance.
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